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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2A-10/12-13/77 
In the Matter of 
BRIGHTON TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
-and-
RICHARD RAZ 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
-CASE_N.O-.._.U=25A3.. 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Richard Raz, charging 
party herein, from a hearing officer's decision dismissing his charge that the 
Brighton Transportation Association (BTA) violated §209-a.'.2(at) of the Taylor 
Law in that it breached its duty of fair representation to him when it refused 
to take his grievance to arbitration. Mr. Raz had been a bus driver for the 
Brighton Central School District for several years, driving in both the morning 
and afternoon runs. During that period of time, he was separately employed as 
a police officer by the Town of Brighton working the midnight shift. He was 
transferred to the morning shift by the Town and, therefore, could no longer 
drive the morning run for the School District. He then asked the District's 
Director of Transportation to give him part-time status, assigning him the 
afternoon run only. She refused. Raz's status was changed to substitute 
driver, but he was never called as a substitute. 
Raz's grievance related to his being denied status as a part-time driver 
only. When it was denied at Stage 1, BTA appealed but it was denied again at 
Stage 2. Thereafter, BTA held a meeting at which its attorney persuaded them 
"to take the grievance to Stage 3,which is arbitration. Subsequently, several 
5
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members of BTA expressed concern that they had voted without knowing all the 
facts and a second meeting of BTA was held. The District's Director of Trans-
portation was invited and attended. She satisfied the members of BTA that the 
grievance was without merit and they reversed their previous action and decided 
not to take the grievance to arbitration. Mr. Raz had not been available to 
attend either meeting. 
The hearing officer is correct in his conclusion of law that an employee 
organization need not carry every grievance to arbitration so- long as it ad-
ministers all grievances fairly, impartially and in good faith. The circum-
stances in this case raise two questions as to whether that test was met. 
First, there is the testimony of another driver that he had offered to switch 
runs with Mr. Raz but that the District's Director of Transportation had de-
clined the offer. This testimony might reflect upon the merits of the griev-
ance. However, it cannot reflect discredit upon BTA because the circumstance 
was not brought to the attention of the membership when they decided not to 
arbitrate the grievance. 
The second troublesome fact is that the Director of Transportation told 
the members that she had not assigned Mr. Raz work as a substitute driver for 
personal reasons, that is, because he had been harassing her. If, as appears 
likely, the harassment related to action taken by Mr. Raz to pressure her to 
grant him the afternoon run that he was seeking, those actions might have been 
sufficiently related to his grievance to make improper her refusal to assign 
him work as a substitute. The hearing officer correctly noted that the BTA 
membership was not asked to process a grievance regarding the referral to 
assign substitute work to Mr. Raz. Mr. Raz argues, however, that they should 
have concluded riot only that the Director of Transportation's personal antipathy 
to him was improper but that it antidated and motivated her refusal to assign him 
an afternoon run. On the record, BTA could have concluded that this antipathy 
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grew out of events that followed her denying him an afternoon run and was not 
a motivation for that denial. 
We believe that the procedures followed by BTA in deciding not to take the 
grievance to arbitration were more casual than they should have been. Greater 
effort should have been made to give Raz an opportunity to try to persuade BTA 
to process his grievance further. In particular, it should have given him ah 
opportunity to respond to the presentation of the District's Director of Trans-
portation. However, the evidence does not indicate that BTA's conduct was im-
properly motivated or so negligent or irresponsible as to constitute a breach 
of the duty of fair representation. 
ACCORDINLY, WE AFFIRM the finding of the hearing officer. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER THAT the charge herein be dismissed. 
Dated, New York, New York 
October 12, 1977 
JOSEEfi R/ CROWLEY 
J L . JdZi 
IDA KLAUS 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHURCHVILLE-CHILI CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
- and -
CHURCHVILLE-CHILI EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
The charge herein, which was filed by the Churchville-Chili Education 
Association (Association), alleges that the Churchville-Chili Central School 
District (District) committed an improper practice in violation of §§209-a.l(a 
and (d) of the Taylor Law in that it unilaterally and without proper motiva-
tion changed certain terms and conditions of employment of unit employees. 
During the life of an agreement, the District unilaterally reduced the hours 
of summer employment of guidance counselors and of the Director of Physical 
Education without contemplating any reduction in the work produced by these 
employees. The hearing officer determined that this constituted a refusal to 
negotiate and the District has not filed exceptions to that determination. 
The hearing officer also determined that the District's unilateral abolishment 
of the position of Television Director and its assignment of the duties of 
\ 
that position to the Chairman of the Library Department was a refusal to 
negotiate. This determination, too, is not before us because the District 
has filed no exceptions. 
The Association has taken exception to that part of the hearing 
officer's decision that dismisses its charge that the District failed to 
negotiate in good faith when it unilaterally assigned to the Director of 
BOARD DECISION & ORDER 
CASE No. U-2273 
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Physical Education two teaching periods. The hearing officer determined that 
the assignment of a second teaching hour was authorized by Section III.K of th<> 
agreement which permits the District to assign two classes to any department 
chairman who supervises between ten and thirteen teachers and that the number 
of teachers in physical education falls within that number. The Association 
argues that this contract clause applies "only to 'Department Chairpersons'" 
and that "The Director of Health, Physical Education and Swimming is not a 
'Department Chairperson', but is a Director." (Emphasis as in the Association's 
brief). It also argues that the Director supervises between forty-eight and 
fifty-three positions because his department includes coaches of intramural 
and interscholastic sports, among others. 
The basic point of difference between the Association and the hearing 
officer is the hearing officer's conclusion that the Director of Physical 
Education has several different and separable assignments. He finds divisible 
the assignments of Chairman of the Department of Physical Education and 
Director of Athletics. It is in the one capacity that he is subject to 
Section III.K of the contract and was assigned a second class because he 
supervises no more than thirteen teachers. It is in the other that he 
supervises a large number of coaches and other employees. The hearing 
officer finds support for his conclusion in the fact that the Director is 
separately compensated for the two positions. This derives from an inter-
pretation of Exhibit CP 3. It shows a basic salary for the Director of 
Physical Education supplemented by two stipends. One is for his supervisory 
responsibilities as Department Head, and the other for his work as the 
Director of Health, Physical Education and Swimming Programs. We agree with 
the hearing officer that this establishes the divisible nature of the 
Director's assignments. A Q ^ ft 
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The Association also makes an argument that even if, as a matter of law 
the assignments are divisible, the District has - by past practice - treated 
the assignments as one. The basis for this position is that when the position 
was created in 1970, it involved the teaching of two periods but that in 
1971-72, with the inclusion of after school swim activities in the Director's 
responsibilities, the teaching assignment was reduced to one. There is an 
explanation for this other than the District's acquiescence in treating the 
divisible assignments as one. It is that the teaching workload was reduced 
at a time when the Director was given charge of the after school swim program 
so that his total workload would not be so onerous as to interfere with the 
performance of his several - albeit separable - duties; thus, when the after 
school swim program was abandoned for the 1976-77 school year, the reason 
for cutting the teaching assignment evaporated., 
We affirm the conclusion of the hearing officer that the assignment of 
a second teaching period to the Chairman of the Department of Physical 
Education was authorized by the contract and therefore, did not involve a 
refusal to negotiate. 
The Association makes a request in its exceptions for a modification 
of his order. This request is not in the nature of an exception because 
it is beyond question that a remedial order of the kind requested by the 
Association would have been illegal on June 16, 1977 when the hearing 
officer's decision was issued. By virtue of L. 1977 c. 429 which became 
effective on July 12, 1977 and which amended §205.5(d) of the Taylor Law, 
this Board now has expanded authority to prescribe remedies for a violation 
of the duty to negotiate in good faith. The Association requests us to use 
that expanded authority to order the District to restore the status quo ante 
for guidance counselors, the Director of Physical Education, the Television 
Director and the Chairman of the Library Department and to make them whole 
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for any losses that they may have suffered. 
The District responds that the request must be disregarded because "The 
Charging Party is asking the Board to exercise authority now that it did not 
possess in June or during any time in which such exceptions might have been 
timely filed. . .". It argues "that the Board may not exercise its new powers 
to this or any other case decided prior to July 12, 1977." 
-We—bell-eve -that it—would-be inappropriate- to--issue-a -remedial-order- -that 
was first authorized by an amendment to the Taylor Law that took effect oa. July 
12, 1977 -"- in a case such as this in which the hearing officer's decision was 
issued before that date.— 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the Churchville-Chili Central School District to 
negotiate in good faith with the Churchville-Chili Education Association 
regarding the_ hours of summer employment of guidance counselors and the 
Director of Physical Education and the assignment of the duties of the 
Television Director to the Chairman of the Library Department. 
Dated: New York, New York 
October 12, 1977 
JOSEPH R. CROWLEY 
i 
j ^ /b%P*w» 
IDA KLAUS 
—' On that day the Association could still have filed exceptions which could 
have urged reconsideration of the proposed remedy of the hearing officer. 
Section 204.10 of our rules permits the filing of exceptions within 15 work-
ing days of receipt of the hearing officer's decision. The decision was 
received by the Association on June 20, 1977. The 15th day was July 12, 1977 
Further, under Section 204.14(c) of our rules, we could have decided to re-
view the remedial action of the hearing officer until July 19, 1977. Even 
though the time limitation expressed in Section 204.14(c) of our rules may 
not be obligatory in a situation in which the remedial power of this Board 
was expanded during the intervening period, we think that it would not be 
appropriate for us to exercise our discretion to alter the remedy under 
these circumstances. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD #20-10/12-13/77 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF FIRE COMMISSIONERS, 
BRIGHTON FIRE DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
- and -
THE BRIGHTON PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of The Brighton Professional 
Firefighters Association (firefighters) from the decision of a hearing officer 
dismissing its charge that the Board of Fire Commissioners, Brighton Fire 
District (fire district) violated Section 209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law when 
it refused to participate in the arbitration of a contract grievance. The 
hearing officer determined that the charge was not timely because it had 
1 
been filed more than four months after the action complained of had occurred. 
The fire district objects to consideration of the exceptions on the ground 
that they too are not timely. 
Our file contains a return receipt from the U. S. Post Office signed 
by a representative of the firefighters and specifying that our decision was 
received by him on August 24, 1977. Moreover^ a stamped postmark is dated 
August 25, 1977. In either case, the exceptions which were received by us on 
2 
September 14, 1977 were timely. 
1 Section 204.1(a)(1) permits the filing of an improper practice charge within 
four months of the action complained of. 
_2 Section 204.10 of our Rules permits exceptions within 15 working days after 
receipt of the hearing officer's decision. The term "working'days" is 
defined by Section 209 of our Rules as excluding Saturdays, Sundays and 
legal holidays. Therefore, only 14 working days elapsed between August 24 
and September 14. 
/sOrHQ 
BOARD DECISION & ORDER 
CASE No. U-2636 
Board - U-2636 -2 .. 
We turn, therefore, to the merits of the firefighters' exceptions. 
After the underlying grievance had been denied at Stage 1, the firefighters 
demanded arbitration on November 5, 1976. That demand was refused by the 
fire district in writing on November 15, 1976. On November 22, counsel to 
the firefighters wrote the fire district that the fire district's refusal to 
participate in the arbitration was "rejected" and that he was advising the 
grievant "to resort to his civil remedies". On December 2, 1976, the fire 
district responded negatively to the firefighters' letter of November 22 and, 
on December 10, the firefighters were told orally that "the position of the 
Board was final...." The firefighters argue that the charge is timely because 
the fire district did not refuse to participate in the arbitration of the 
grievance until December 10, 1976. The hearing officer found that the fire 
district refused to participate in the arbitration on November 15, 1976 and 
that the charge was filed more than four months thereafter. He wrote: 
"The charging party takes the somewhat anomalous position 
that, because respondent's attorneys were courteous enough to 
further discuss and explain respondent's position on going to 
arbitration, the original rejection was something other than the 
final word. Not once, however, did respondent's attorneys indi-
cate that it would reconsider its decision of November 15, which 
stands, therefore, as the date from which the four months in which 
an improper practice charge could be timely filed began to run." 
We agree with this reasoning. Moreover, even if the charge were 
timely, we would dismiss it because it does not set forth a violation of 
Section 209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law. Expressing no opinion on the obliga-
tion of the fire district to process the grievance through arbitration, we 
note that the duty to arbitrate derives from the contract between the 
parties. In Matter of St. Lawrence County, 10 PEEB 1f3058 (1977) we 
determined that breach of a collectively negotiated contract does not 
4920 
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1 
of itself constitute a refusal to negotiate. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be dismissed. 
Dated: New York, New York 
October 12, 1977 
JOSEPH yt. CROWLEY 
JC%U<s<L^~ 
IDA KLAUS 
To the same effect, see Section 205.5(d) of the Taylor Law as amended by 
Chapter 429 of the Laws of 1977 which provides that this Board "shall 
not have authority to enforce an agreement between an employer and an 
employee organization and shall not exercise jurisdiction over an alleged 
violation of such an agreement that would not otherwise constitute an 
improper employer or employee organization practice." 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//2D-10/12-13/77 
CITY OF BINGHAMTON, 
-and-
In the Matter of 
Respondent, 
BINGHAMTON FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 729, IAFF, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
BINGHAMTON FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 729, IAFF, 
AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
-and-
CITY OF BINGHAMTON, 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Case No. U-2662 
Case No. U-2776 
On April 18, 1977, the Binghamton Fix-ef ighters, Local 729, 
IAFF, AFL-CIO (hereinafter Local 729), filed a charge alleging 
that the City of Binghmaton (hereinafter employer) refused to 
negotiate with it in violation of Section 209-a.l(d) of the 
Taylor Law with respect to personnel on "permanent 207-a status".— 
— This refers to Section 207-a of the General Municipal Law 
which provides that a fireman "who is injured in the per-
formance of his duties . . . shall be paid by the municipality 
or fire department by which he is employed, the full amount of 
his regular salary or wages until his disability arising there-
from has ceased . . .". "Permanent" 207-a status is not a 
statutory construct. Rather, it is the employer's designation 
of those firemen who are paid pursuant to Section 207-a who 
are not expected to ever recover enough to return to duisy>r?.fi 
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{ \ In its answer the employer admits that it had refused to nego-
tiate with Local 729 regarding the firemen in permanent Section 
207-a status. It justifies its refusal by arguing that those 
persons are no longer public employees under the Taylor Law. 
On July 11, 1977, the employer filed a charge alleging that 
Local-'"7'2"9_~re"fused"—to: negl5triate^ m^ 
729 sought to compel it to arbitrate terms and conditions of 
20 permanently disabled firemen who are receiving benefits under 
General Municipal Law Section 207-a. 
The two proceedings have been consolidated. As both involve 
a disagreement as to the scope of negotiations under the Taylor 
Law, they are being processed under Section 204.4 of our Rules 
^ of Procedure which provide for submission of the dispute to this 
Board without a report and recommendation from a hearing officer. 
FACTS 
The facts as stipulated by the parties are: 
"1. On February 1, 1977, at the first nego-
tiation session for a new contract, representa-
tives of the City presented the annexed Exhibit 
A to representatives of the Binghamton Fire-
fighters , Local 729, IAFF. 
[Exhibit A is the following statement of the 
employer: 'We do not intend to negotiate with 
Local 729 as to terms and conditions of em-
ployment of all personnel in permanent 207-a 
status upon the ground that those persons are 
no longer public employees under the Taylor 
Law.'] 
/ " • 
Board - U-2662 & U-2776 
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2. The Blnghamton Firefighters, Local 729, 
IAFP is the recognized exclusive negotiating 
representative for all employees of the Blng-
hamton Bureau of Fire, excluding the Fire 
Chief. 
3- Salary increases negotiated in prior 
years by the Blnghamton Firefighters, Local 
729, IAFF and other contractual fringe benefits 
have been extended to personnel .covered by 
Section 207-a of the General Municipal Law." 
The only other item submitted by the parties is the 1976 agreement 
between them. 
DISCUSSION 
It is undisputed that the negotiating unit that has been 
represented by Local 729 In the past includes all firemen who 
were on 207-a status. This is made clear by Article IX, Section A 
of the 1976 agreement which denies a uniform allowance to a "Member 
of the Bureau of Fire...[who is] permanently classified as 207(a)." 
Moreover, in 1976 this Board was called upon by the parties herein 
to rule upon whether three demands of the employer were mandatory 
subjects of negotiations, all of which related to firemen on 
Section 207-a status, Matter of City of Binghamton, 9 PERB 113026. 
To the extent that the employer's position is that the unit 
ought not include permanently disabled firemen, it must be re-
jected in this case. A change in a negotiating unit is not a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. Such a change may be sought 
through the institution of a representation proceeding but not 
by the filing of an improper practice charge (Matter of So. 
Board - U-2662 & U-2776 -4 
Cayuga CSD, 9 PERB 113056, aff'd Sup. Ct., Monroe County, April 22, 
1977, not officially reported, 10 PERB 117008). Thus the employer's 
position that it need not negotiate with Local 729 with respect 
to permanently disabled firemen can:, be sustained only if such 
firemen are not public employees within the meaning of the 
Taylor Law. However, this proposition must be rejected. Section 
2"0T77"(~a)~of "the"Taylor" Law tiref in:e~s~ a 4tpubrlircr-enrpl oyeir" a~s — — 
"any person holding a position by appointment 
or employment in the service of a public em-
ployer. . . " . 
The statute does specify exceptions but those exceptions are not 
relevant to the issue before us. General Municipal Law §207-a 
requires the payment of benefits to disabled firemen "by the 
municipality or fire department by which he is employed...". 
It therefore appears that a fireman on Section 2 07-a status 
is an employee of the municipality and remains such until he is 
properly terminated by the municipality or fire department by which 
he was employed at the time he acquired that status. 
One court decision :raise-s;'. the possibility that the right 
to benefits under General Municipal Law §207-a can be separated 
from employment status. It is Matter of Earl Tyler v. Leonard 
Gadwood, 279 App. Div. 1138 (4th Dept., 1952). That case.deals 
with a person who had been appointed a temporary fireman and had 
become disabled. As he was a temporary employee, he could have 
been and was dismissed, but the court found that he continued 
to be entitled to benefits under Section 207-a. That was a 
unique situation. The record herein does not indicate that any 
of the 20 permanently disabled firemen had been terminated. 
4AOJT 3&0 
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Except in the case of a voluntarily retired employee, a temporary 
employee who was terminated, or perhaps a permanent employee who 
r^ was discharged pursuant to Section 75 of the Civil Service Law,;, a 
disabled fireman receiving benefits under General Municipal Law 
§207-a continues to be the employee of the municipality that hired 
him, Matter of Birmingham v. Mirrington, 284 App. Div. 721 (4th Dept., 
0:9541. " - - •- - " — — 
2 
The employer raises one other point that we must consider. 
It argues that General Municipal Law §207-a is subordinate to the 
Taylor Law and that Local 729 must therefore negotiate over demands 
that would deny statutory benefits to disabled firemen. We have 
already dealt with this question in Matter of City of Binghamton, 
supra, and rejected it. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge in Case U-2 7 76 be 
dismissed and 
WE FURTHER ORDER the City of Binghamton to 
negotiate with Local 729 regarding 
2_ Two further points raised by- the parties must have no bearing 
on our decisions. One is the contention that General Municipal 
Law §207-a does not require the payment of negotiated increases 
to disabled firefighters as a matter of law. The second 
deals with the implications of an amendment to §2 07-a that 
will take effect on January 1, 1978 (L. 1977, c. 965) and will 
permit permanently disabled firemen to be retired or to be 
assigned light duty at the request of the employer. 
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DATED: New York, New York 
October 12, 1977 
the terms and conditions of employment 
of permanently disabled firemen who are 
receiving benefits under General Municipal 
Law §207-a. 
/? 
Jo'sepyn R. Crowley, /Member 
I d a K l a u s , Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2E-10/12-13/77 
In the Matter of 
BRADFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
3.KAI)FORD TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2328 
The Bradford Teachers Association (BTA) has filed exceptions to the 
decision of a hearing officer dismissing its charge that the Bradford Central 
School District (district) violated §209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) of the Taylor 
1 
Law when its supervising principal and board of education reprimanded the 
president of BTA for issuing a press release announcing scholarships and prizes 
awarded by BTA to graduating high school students. The hearing officer 
determined that the district did reprimand the president of BTA as charged, 
but that the reprimand was not for the purpose of depriving her or any other 
employee of protected rights. He also determined that the issuance by BTA of 
the press release announcing its scholarship awards did not constitute an 
exercise of any right protected by the Taylor Law. 
1 These sections of the Act provide that "It shall be an improper practice 
for a public employer or its agents deliberately (a) to interfere with, 
restrain or coerce public employees in the exercise of their rights guaran-
teed in section two hundred two for the purpose of depriving them of such 
rights; (b) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration 
of any employee organization for the purpose of depriving them of such 
rights; (c) to discriminate against any employee for the purpose of 
encouraging or discouraging membership in, or participation in the activities 
of, any employee organization;..." (emphasis supplied) 
Board - U-2328 -2 
After reading the briefs of the parties and hearing oral argument 
by BTA, we remanded the matter to the hearing officer to obtain more evidence 
relating to the press release. On the basis of the now completed record, we 
affirm the conclusion of the hearing officer that the conduct of the district 
did not violate §209-& of--the. Taylor Law. 
FACTS 
_.On.April 13,_ 1976 the district's, supervising principal issued a 
memorandum containing, inter alia, the following: 
"All public media news releases concerning the school district 
will either be initiated through the Office or cleared through 
the Office prior to release. In this manner, we will have a 
record of news releases and the Office will be responsible for 
district information. The administration encourages news 
releases to the public on school activities." 
Thereafter, BTA issued the press release in question. It was clearly identi-
fied as a release of BTA. However when, on June 29, 1976, a story appeared 
in the "Corning Leader", a local newspaper, the story described what 
appeared to be a school activity, rather than a union activity, and it was 
so understood by the supervising principal and the school board. Without 
checking to ascertain whether the release had been issued in the name of BTA, 
on July 1, 1976 the supervising principal wrote to the BTA president repri-
manding her for issuing a release concerning the school district which had not 
been cleared through his office. When BTA protested the reprimand, the super-
vising principal sent the BTA president a second letter reaffirming the repri-
mand. On July 14, 1976 the school board ratified the reprimand in a letter 
that it sent to all teachers which characterized the issuance of the press 
release by BTA as an act of "pettiness, unprofessionalism, and demoralizing 
insubordination...." 
The conduct of the supervising principal and of the school board was 
not warranted. It violated standards of fairness and rules of courtesy, but it 
„did not violate the Taylor Law because it was not for the purpose of depriving 
Board - U-2328 
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employees of protected rights. The district's conduct followed a misconception 
that the issuance of the release had violated its procedures. It was undis-
puted by both parties that the supervising principal's memorandum did not apply 
to press releases issued by BTA about BTA activities. The district acknowledges 
that it would have no objection to the BTA press release if it were so identi-
fied. , Here the district reacted to the newspaper story precipitously. Even 
if it were understandable for the supervising principal to assume on July 1 ; 
that the story reflected the BTA release, it is not understandable that, after 
the protest of BTA, the Board should have issued its intemperate letter without 
first ascertaining the true facts. But, we do not find the district's conduct 
to be violative of Sections 209-a.l(a), (b) or (c) of the Taylor Law. Each of 
these three subparagraphs condemns conduct of a public employer that was designe 
to deprive employees of their rights of organization or was for the purpose of 
encouraging or discouraging participation in the activities of an employee 
organization. The district's conduct herein, albeit imprudent, was not so 
motivated. BTA argues that such employer motivation must be imputed to the 
district because its conduct was inherently destructive of significant employee 
rights. .£ We do not read the letters of the supervising principal or the board 
as being inherently destructive of such rights. 
ACCORDINGLY, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed 
Dated, New York, New York 
October 12, 1977 
0-C^-c^L- X J W ^ Z ^ 
IDA KLAUS 
See NLRB v. Great Dane, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967) for development of the doc-
trine that conduct that is inherently destructive .of significant employee 
rights is an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2F-10/12/13-77 
In the Matter 
BOARD 
CIVIL 
OF 
of 
EDUCATION, 
SERVICE 
(YONKERS CITY 
-and-
CITY OF YONKERS, : 
Respondent, : 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION : 
-SCHOOL DISTRICT UNIT), : 
Charging Party, : 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2408 
The charge herein was filed by the Yonkers City School District Unit 
of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA). It alleges that the 
Board of Education of the City of Yonkers (employer) breached its duty to 
negotiate in good faith when it unilaterally decided to withdraw the coverage 
of its employees by the Social Security System. The employer acknowledges 
that it decided to withdraw such coverage unilateE&lly, but it justifies this 
refusal to negotiate by the argument that the Social Security System provides 
1 
retirement benefits and retirement benefits may not be negotiated. 
The hearing officer concluded that "social security is a form of 
insurance distinct and separate from any retirement system...[and that 
CSL §201.4] is not referable to social security." The employer has filed 
exceptions to the hearing officer's ruling that withdrawal from Social Security 
1^  Section 201.4 of the Taylor Law provides: 
"The term 'terms and conditions of employment' means salaries, wages, 
hours, agency shop fee deduction and other terms and conditions of 
employment provided, however, that such term shall not include agency 
shop fee deduction for negotiating units comprised of employees of 
the state or any benefits provided by or to be provided by a public 
retirement system, or payments to a fund or insurer to provide an 
income for retirees, or payment to retirees or their beneficiaries. 
No such retirement benefits shall be negotiated pursuant to this 
article, and any benefits so negotiated shall be void." 
A5>' 
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is a mandatory subj ect of negotiation and that its unilateral action violated 
2 
§209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law. In support of its exceptions, it has submitted 
a brief that contains many arguments why we should consider Social Security 
coverage to be a retirement benefit within the meaning of CSL §201.4. In 
reply, CSEA argues that Social Security ^s distinguishable from a retirement 
system because it "is intended to protect individuals against loss of income 
due to inability to work for whatever reason." 
Since the filing of the employer's exceptions, there has been a change 
in New York State law that makes it unnecessary for us to decide whether or 
not Social Security coverage is a retirement benefit. Chapter 837 of the Laws 
of 1977 prohibits a political subdivision from withdrawing from the Social 
Security System and nullified the unilateral decision of the employer to do 
3 
so. 
2_ Section 209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law provides: 
"to refuse to negotiate in good faith with duly recognized or 
certified representatives of its public employers." 
3^  L.77, c.837 provides: 
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, 
on and after the effective date of this act a political sub-
division, as defined in section one hundred thirty-one of the 
retirement and sooial security law, shall be prohibited from 
discontinuing coverage of its employees under the provisions 
of the federal social security act (42 U.S.C.A. §301 et seq.) 
as amended." 
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FACTS 
Without having negotiated about the matter, the employer adopted a 
resolution on September 9, 1976, terminating its participation in the Social 
Security System effective June 30, 1979. Written notice of the employer's 
action was transmitted to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare by 
the Director of the New York State Social Security Agency on September 30, 1976 
The charge herein was filed on November 18, 1976and the hearing officer's 
decision was issued on June 24, 1977. Chapter 837 of the Laws of 1977 became 
effective on August 11, 1977. The Attorney General issued a formal opinion 
to the State Comptroller on October 3, 1977 interpreting that enactment. 
Noting that under the Social Security Act (42 USC §418) notice of a decision 
to withdraw from coverage may be rescinded by a public employer prior to the 
date on which coverage ends, he ruled that: 
"The pending twenty-one notices of intention to terminate 
coverage are now rescinded as a matter of law. In other 
words, any political subdivision which has not actually 
terminated its coverage under the Social Security Act as 
ofAugust 11, 1977 is barred from terminating such coverage...." 
CONCLUSION 
We withdraw the Order of the hearing officer directing the employer to 
negotiate in good faith over the termination of Social Security coverage 
because there can be no duty to negotiate over the performance of what has 
become an illegal act (Matter of Auburn City Unit, CSEA, 9 PERB 1J3084 [1976]). 
DATED: New York, New York 
October 12, 1977 
§ ^ / < ^ ^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
Hi* Jut 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND, 
Employer, 
- and -
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Service Employees 
International Union, AFL-CIO (SEIU) to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation rejecting its objections to the 
conduct of an election involving a unit of employees of Rockland County. 
The exceptions complain that the election should have been set aside because 
the ballots of employees of the judicial branch of the state goverment were 
counted. Rockland County and the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. 
(CSEA) both responded to the exceptions by asserting that SEIU waived any 
objection to the counting of the ballots in question. CSEA also argues that 
the court personnel share a community of interest with the county employees 
and might properly belong with them in a single negotiating unit temporarily. 
FACTS 
On June 1, 1976 SEIU filed a petition to be certified in the place of 
CSEA as exclusive representative of employees of Rockland County other than 
BOARD DECISION & ORDER 
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faculty at the community college, deputy sheriffs and jailors and blue collar 
employees of the Highway Department. This petition was consolidated with two 
others seeking changes in the unit and a hearing was held. In a decision 
issued on February 16, 1977 we retained the existing unit and we directed 
that an election be held in that unit with the eligibility date for voting 
to be. February 11, 1977. At. that time, the court personnel were employees ... 
of Rockland County. This changed on April 1, 1977 by reason of the enactment 
of Section 220.6 of the Judiciary Law which provides in part: 
" [C]ommencing April first nineteen hundred seventy-? seven.. . 
employees of the courts and court-related agencies of 
the unified court system...shall be employees of the 
state of New York...." 
That enactment also provides for the filing of petitions to alter existing 
negotiating units by separating court employees from other employees 
(Judiciary Law §220.7). Effective August 5, 1976, new agreements affecting 
the terms and conditions of court personnel are "subject to the prior approval 
of the administrative board of the judicial conference." (Judiciary Law 
§220.6[b]). No petition has been filed to alter the unit placement of the 
court personnel who had been employees of Rockland County. 
The election, which was held on April 27,2977was inconclusive and 
a run-off election was held on May 25, 1977. First, Rockland County and 
then SEIU challenged the consideration of ballots cast by approximately 
thirty-three court officers on the ground that they were state employees. 
Both the County and SEIU withdrew their challenges and the disputed ballots 
were then counted. The vote was CSEA 674 and SEIU 664. Thereafter SEIU's 
designated observer signed the tally of ballots on behalf of SEIU, certifying 
the accuracy and fairness of the count and the tabulation. 
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DISCUSSION 
It is the contention of SEIU that its consent to the counting of the bal-
lots of the court personnel should have been disregarded because it constituted 
a definition of the unit and only PERB could determine whether court personnel 
were in the unit. This contention overlooks the language of Section 207 
~of the Taylor l,mti^ •--
standards in defining negotiating units in the course of "resolving disputes 
concerning representation status . . .". 
A question might arise if the parties were to consent to the counting of 
the ballots of people who were not given representation rights by the Taylor 
Law. However, this is not the fact in this case. 
We find the consent of SEIU to the counting of the ballots of the court 
personnel to be final and binding. On April 1, 1977 they ceased to be County 
employees but they continued to be public employees within the ambit of the 
Taylor Law. Until a petition is filed pursuant to Judiciary Law Section 220.7 
and resolved, their unit placement will not be clear. The Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation suggests that Judiciary Law Section 
220.6(b) establishes a joint employer relationship between the County and the 
Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference. We do not reach that ques-
tion in deciding that SEIU cannot now be heard objecting to the counting of 
ballots when it consented at the time of the election. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the objections to the conduct of the elec-
tion be and they hereby are dismissed. 
Dated, New York, New York 
October 12, 1977 
o^^l, A^UM^S-
IDA KLAUS ^ t 
PERB 58 
(3.0-75) 
In t h e M a t t e r o f 
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND, 
- a n d -
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
CIV IL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, I N C . , 
ROCKLAND COUNTY, 
I n t e r v e n o r . 
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E m p l o y e r , 
C A S E . N O . ' C-1397 
CERTrFTCaTTON"OF-REPRESENTA-TIVE"-AMD"ORDErr"TO-MEG0TrA-TE"^— 
A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g h a v i n g b e e n c o n d u c t e d i n t h e 
a b o v e m a t t e r by t h e P u b l i c Employment R e l a t i o n s Board i n a c c o r -
d a n c e w i t h t h e P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r .Employment A c t and t h e 
R u l e s of P r o c e d u r e of t h e B o a r d , and i t , a p p e a r i n g t h a t a 
n e g o t i a t i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e h a s b e e n s e l e c t e d ; 
P u r s u a n t t o t h e - a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n ' t h e Board by t h e 
P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r Employment A c t , 
IT I S HEREBY CERTIFIED t h a t . Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc . , Rockland County 
h a s b e e n d e s i g n a t e d and s e l e c t e d by a m a j o r i t y o f t h e e m p l o y e e s 
of t h e above-named p u b l i c e m p l o y e r , • i n t h e u n i t d e s c r i b e d b e l o w , 
a s t h e i r e x c l u s i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e fo r . t h e p u r p o s e of c o l l e c t i v e 
n e g o t i a t i o n s and t h e s e t t l e m e n t of g r i e v a n c e s . -
J n i t : I n c l u d e d : A l l employees e x c l u s i v e o f t h o s e s p e c i f i c a l l y men t i oned 
b e l o w . 
E x c l u d e d : A l l employees i n t h e u n c l a s s i f i e d s e r v i c e ; a l l employees i n 
t h e exempt c l a s s o f t h e c l a s s i f i e d s e r v i c e ; t h e o f f i c e r o r 
head o f each d e p a r t m e n t , o f f i c e o r agency who has the power' 
t o a p p o i n t , p u r s u a n t t o l aw , any employee a p p o i n t e d as a 
d e p u t y t o such o f f . i c e r o r head o f d e p a r t m e n t , o f f i c e o r 
agency and i s p a i d as s u c h , and t h e c h i e f e x e c u t i v e o r 
d i r e c t o r o f each d e p a r t m e n t , o f f i c e o r agency under t h e 
j u r i s d i c t i o n o f a boa rd o r c o m m i s s i o n ; depu ty s h e r i f f s and 
" j a i l e r s ; s t u d e n t emp loyees ; a l l e x e c u t i v e , m a n a g e r i a l , 
' a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , c o n f i d e n t i a l , s u p e r v i s o r y and p r o f e s s i o n a l 
emp loyees . 
F u r t h e r , . I T IS ORDERED t h a t t h e above-named p u b l i c e m p l o y e r 
s h a l l n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y ' w i t h Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc . , Rockland County 
fend e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t w i t h such emp loyee o r g a n i z a t i o n 
tfith r e g a r d t o t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s of employmen t , and s h a l l -
n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h s u c h emp loyee o r g a n i s a t i o n i n t h e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f , and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of , g r i e v a n c e s . 
S i g n e d on t h e 12th d a y o f October 19 77 
/ Joseph R. Crowley 
Ida K laus 
43* 
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In the Matter of 
FAIRPORT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- and -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner. 
BOARD DECISION 
On July 14, 1977, the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
(herein referred to as the petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure (herein referred to as the Rules) of the New York State Public Employment 
Relations Board (herein referred to as the Board) a timely petition for certifi-
cation as the exclusive negotiating representative for all Village employees of 
the Village of Akron (herein referred to as the employer). Thereafter, the 
parties entered into a Consent Agreement providing that the appropriate unit is 
as follows: 
Included: All full time and part time bus drivers, 
mechanics and bus driver-mechanics employed 
by the Fairport Central School Transportation 
Department. 
Excluded: Director of Transportation^ clerk-typist and 
all other employees. 
Pursuant to the Consent Agreement, a secret ballot election was 
held under the supervision of the Director on September 21. The results of the 
CASE NO. C-1521 
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election indicate that a majority of the eligible voters in the unit set forth 
in the Consent Agreement do"not desire to be represented for purposes of 
1/ 
collective negotiations by the petitioner. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the instant petition should be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
Dated at New York, New York 
This 12ch day of October, 1977 
/Zjbu<*csQ^^' 
Ida Klaus 
1/ There were 14 ballots cast in favor of and 52 cast against representation 
by the petitioner and 6 challenged ballots. 
